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Abstract
Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional
non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution. In particular, in
the present paper we study a model of non-cooperative multilateral bargaining with a
very general proposer selection protocol and set of feasible payoffs. In each period of
the bargaining game, one out of n players is recognized as the proposer according to an
irreducible Markov process. The proposer offers a particular element of the convex set of
feasible payoffs. If all players accept the offer, it is implemented. If a player rejects the offer,
with some probability the negotiations break down and with the remaining probability the
next period starts. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies exist
and we fully characterize the set of such equilibria. Our main result is that in the limit,
as the exogenous risk of breakdown goes to zero, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution
of the Markov proposer selection process as the weight vector.
Keywords: Nash bargaining solution, subgame perfect equilibrium, stationary strategies,
Markov process.
JEL codes: C78.
1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the Nash program of supporting solution concepts from coop-
erative game theory by obtaining them as equilibrium outcomes of suitably constructed
non-cooperative games. More specifically, we will be concerned with the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution. Consider a situation where two players receive a given pair of payoffs
if they disagree, but may obtain any element of a convex set of other (superior) payoff
pairs if they mutually agree on one such element. The Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
is that payoff pair which maximizes the product of players’ gains over their disagreement
payoff. Nash (1950) showed that this is the unique bargaining solution satisfying the ax-
ioms of scale invariance, symmetry, efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
One can generalize the NBS by assigning different weights to the players. The asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) is that payoff pair which maximizes a weighted product
of players’ gains over their disagreement payoff, see Kalai (1977).
The NBS is used to gain insights on a wide variety of problems in economics. For
instance, Bester (1993) compares the effects of different pricing mechanisms on price and
quality of a product. In particular, posted pricing is compared to bargaining between
a buyer and a seller. In the latter case, the ANBS is taken to be the outcome of the
bargaining interaction.
Another common application is wage bargaining between a firm and a union: Firm
owners and workers can agree to produce and hence create a surplus. A part of the surplus
goes to the workers as their wage, and the rest goes to the shareholders. If, however, the
two sides cannot find an agreement, the workers may strike or the firm may shut down so
that no surplus is generated. In a seminal paper on wage bargaining, Grout (1984) studies
the effect of different legal frameworks on wage bargaining. Throughout the analysis, it is
assumed that bargaining between the firm and the union leads to the outcome predicted
by the ANBS.
An application to macroeconomic policy making is given by Alesina (1987): In a democ-
racy with two political parties, each party represents voters with different preferences over
macroeconomic policy outcomes. Elections take place regularly, but the probability that
one or the other party wins is fixed exogenously. The parties may either implement their
most preferred policy whenever they are in power or they may agree on a compromise which
will be implemented irrespective of who is in power at any specific point in time. Under
appropriate assumptions on utility functions, making a compromise generates a surplus.
The ANBS is used to predict the division of this surplus; the weights for the ANBS are
given by the exogenous probability of winning an election.
The prominent use of the NBS in applications highlights the need for strong non-
cooperative underpinnings of this concept. In the case of the ANBS, it is imperative to
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examine the non-cooperative or strategic sources of players’ “bargaining power” which
is borne out in the weight vector of the ANBS. Nash (1953) presents a non-cooperative
demand game with two players who are uncertain about which payoff pairs are feasible. In
the limit as the uncertainty vanishes, equilibrium payoffs converge to those predicted by the
NBS. Carlsson (1991) takes a similar approach, but with a different source of uncertainty:
While the set of feasible payoffs is known to both players, their actions are subject to
noise. If players make demands which do not exhaust the available surplus, the remainder
is distributed according to an exogenously fixed rule. In the limit as the noise vanishes,
there is a unique efficient equilibrium. The payoff pair is a particular ANBS; the bargaining
weights are determined by the exogenous division rule.
In a seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) provides a non-cooperative game in which two
players negotiate on the division of a pie. The players take turns acting as the proposer. The
division of the pie in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium depends upon how strongly
players prefer current over future payoffs. In the limit as players become perfectly patient,
the equilibrium division converges to the NBS. In their discussion of cooperative and non-
cooperative approaches to bargaining, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) obtain
the NBS in the limit if either players’ impatience or the risk of an exogenous breakdown
of the negotiations is vanishing.
Although the relationship between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to bar-
gaining are well understood for the case of two players, such is far less the case when
more than two players are involved in the negotiation process. While it is straightfor-
ward to generalize the NBS to n players, the extension of its non-cooperative justification
has turned out to be a much more difficult problem. Krishna and Serrano (1996) make
use of Lensberg’s (1988) stability (consistency) property. They design a non-cooperative
bargaining protocol in which players can exit after partial agreements. This game has a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium and the payoffs implied by that equilibrium converge
to the NBS as the discount factor goes to one. Chae and Yang (1994) obtain uniqueness
of perfect equilibrium and convergence to the NBS in a game where a proposer negotiates
with one responder at a time. In both papers, the results come at the cost of allowing
partial agreements, rather than requiring unanimous consent to a comprehensive proposal.
More recently, support results for the ANBS have been given by Miyakawa (2006) and
Laruelle and Valenciano (2007). They consider a bargaining game where the proposer in
each period is drawn from an invariant probability distribution and unanimous consent is
required. The stationary equilibrium payoffs turn out to converge to the ANBS with that
probability distribution as the weight vector.
Other strands of the bargaining literature consider much more general bargaining pro-
tocols. For instance, in their analysis of uniqueness and efficiency of equilibria in bargaining
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games, Merlo and Wilson (1995) assume that both the size of the cake to be divided and the
order in which players propose and respond follow a Markov process. Kalandrakis (2004)
examines no-delay equilibria in stationary strategies under a Markov selection protocol,
where agreement does not necessarily require unanimous consent of all players, but only of
those within a winning coalition. The set of such equilibria is characterized and shown to
be non-empty. Herings and Predtetchinski (2007) study a game with Markov recognition
probabilities, where the set of feasible payoffs is one-dimensional. While studying delay
or inefficiencies in bargaining games, other authors have used proposer protocols follow-
ing stochastic processes, see for instance Cho and Duggan (2005) and Hyndman and Ray
(2007). In these papers, the stochastic process is not even required to have the Markov
property, so the choice of the proposer may depend on aspects of history other than the
identity of the previous proposer. Since more general selection protocols are used in much
of the bargaining literature, we find it important to extend this approach to the support
results for the NBS.
In this paper we take a general approach towards multilateral bargaining. We aim at
results for the case with n players, a general set of feasible payoffs, and a general bargaining
protocol. An informal description of the game we consider in this paper is as follows.
In the first period of an infinitely repeated bargaining game, the identity of the proposer
is completely arbitrary. In each subsequent period, one out of the n players is recognized
as the proposer according to an irreducible Markov process. Upon recognition, the pro-
poser offers a particular element of a convex and comprehensive set of feasible payoffs.
If all players accept the offer, it is implemented. If a player rejects the offer, with some
exogenously given and constant breakdown probability the game ends, whereas with the
complementary probability the next period starts.
We show that subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies exist and we charac-
terize the set of such equilibria. We then study the limit of an arbitrary sequence of such
equilibria corresponding to a sequence of vanishing breakdown probabilities. We show that
in the limit all players make the same proposal. Our main result is that in the limit this
common proposal coincides with the ANBS with the stationary distribution of the Markov
proposer selection process as the weight vector. Hence, equilibrium payoffs depend only
on the set of feasible payoffs and the stationary distribution associated with the matrix of
transition probabilities.
The proof of our result goes well beyond mere technical generalizations of existing proof
strategies. Since the reservation payoff of a responding player depends on the identity
of the current proposer, reservation payoffs cannot be expressed by a single vector, but
correspond to a matrix. For any value of the exogenous breakdown probability, we consider
the vectors corresponding to the difference between the equilibrium proposals of a pair of
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players. We show that in the limit as the breakdown probability vanishes, these vectors
span an (n−1)-dimensional supporting hyperplane to the set of feasible payoffs at the point
corresponding to the common limit proposal of the players. Finally, we demonstrate that
the unique normal vector to this supporting hyperplane is proportional to the gradient of
the asymmetric Nash product with weights equal to the stationary distribution associated
with the matrix of transition probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes the formal description
of the bargaining game and the definition of the equilibrium concept. In Section 3, we give
necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile of stationary strategies to be an equilibrium
in accordance with that concept. We also show that such an equilibrium exists. In Section
4, the main result is established: our non-cooperative support for the ANBS. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Bargaining Game
We consider the bargaining game Γ(N,M, V ). The set of players is denoted by N , and its
members are indexed from 1 until n. The game is played for potentially infinitely many
periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In each period, one player acts as the proposer. In period t = 0, the
proposer is determined in an arbitrary way. In all later periods, the proposer is chosen by a
Markov chain. The probability distribution on the players in period t > 0 depends on the
identity of the proposer in period t− 1. The entry mji of the matrix M is the probability
that player j will propose in period t given that player i has proposed in period t− 1. All
entries of M are nonnegative and for each i ∈ N , it is true that ∑nj=1mji = 1. The set
V corresponds to all feasible payoffs. We denote V ∩ Rn+ by V+. Our assumptions are as
follows.
(A1) The set V is closed, convex, and comprehensive from below. The origin lies in the
interior of V . The set V+ is bounded and all weakly Pareto-efficient points in V+ are
also strongly Pareto–efficient.
(A2) The matrix M is irreducible.
We denote the interior and boundary of a set X by int(X) and ∂X respectively. A vector
η with ‖η‖ = 1 is said to be normal to the convex set V at a point v¯ ∈ V if (v − v¯)>η ≤ 0
for every v ∈ V. The set of all vectors η normal to V at v¯ is called the normal to V at v¯.
(A3) There is a unique vector in the normal to V at every v ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+.
The assumption that all weakly Pareto-efficient points in V+ are also strongly Pareto–
efficient is essential to our results. As we show later in Section 3, this assumption implies
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that a proposal of a player i gives all other players their respective reservation payoffs.
Thus a proposer always extracts the full surplus from all other players. Our assumptions
with respect to V are similar to those in Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Miyakawa (2006).
The game proceeds as follows. In any period t, first the proposer is chosen in the
aforementioned way. Next, the proposer offers a vector v ∈ V . Then, all players (including
the proposer) decide sequentially whether to accept or reject the offer v, where for the sake
of simplicity we assume that player i responds before player i + 1. We define the set S(i)
consisting of player i and all its successors by S(i) = {j ∈ N | j ≥ i}. If all players have
accepted the vector v in period t, the game ends and each player i receives a payoff of vi. As
soon as one player rejects v, period t+ 1 starts with probability δ, and the game ends with
probability 1− δ. In the latter case, as well as in the case with perpetual disagreement, all
players receive zero payoff. We assume that players maximize expected payoffs.
We denote by Hpi the set of histories after which player i has to make a proposal and by
Hri the set of histories after which player i has to respond to a proposal. Then, a strategy
for player i is a map si : H
p
i ∪Hri → V ∪ {Yes,No}.
Player i’s strategy is stationary if the same proposal is made at all histories Hpi and if
the action taken at any history Hri depends only on the current proposal and the current
proposer.1
A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies from which no player has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) is a profile of strategies
such that its restriction to any subgame is a Nash equilibrium of that subgame.
A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPE) is a profile of stationary strate-
gies which is an SPE.
3 Analysis of Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strate-
gies and show that such equilibria exist. Theorem 3.8 gives the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a strategy profile to be an SSPE and Theorem 3.13 shows that an SSPE
exists.
The analysis in this section resembles Kalandrakis (2004), but some important differ-
ences should be noted: We admit only pure strategies and require unanimous agreement.
Furthermore, we conclude rather than assume that agreement is immediate in SSPE and
1This notion of stationarity is weaker than the notion of subgame consistency due to Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), which implies that a player chooses the same action at any two nodes for which the continuation
game is the same. For instance, suppose that rows i and j of M are identical. Then, the continuation
games after rejection of player i’s proposal and that after rejection of player j’s proposal are identical.
Yet, our definition allows Aik to be different from A
j
k for one or more players k ∈ N .
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we do not impose assumptions on the behavior of players who are indifferent between
acceptance and rejection of some proposal.
Consider a profile of stationary strategies. It can be described by an n× n -matrix Θ,
where the entry θij is the payoff proposed to player j by player i, and a collection A of n2
acceptance sets, where the acceptance set Aij is the set of vectors in V which player j will
accept when proposed by player i. The set of vectors in V proposed by player i and accepted
by player j and his successors is AiS(j) = ∩k∈S(j)Aik. We refer to Ai = AiS(1) =
⋂
j∈N A
i
j as
the social acceptance set for proposer i.
Suppose that in period t, the proposal of player i is rejected. With probability 1 − δ
the game ends and all players receive zero payoff, and with probability δ period t + 1 is
reached and play proceeds according to the profile (Θ,A) of stationary strategies. The
expected payoff to player j after rejection is rij(Θ,A). Omitting the argument (Θ,A) from
the notation wherever possible, we refer to rij as the reservation payoff of player j when i
proposes.
Proposition 3.1 The reservation payoff ri belongs to int(V ).
Proof: Conditional on the next period being reached, the payoffs are determined by a
probability distribution on V (notice that also 0 ∈ V ), so expected payoffs belong to V
since V is convex. Since with probability 1 − δ the next period is not reached, these
expected payoffs equal δ−1ri, so δ−1ri ∈ V. Since 0 ∈ int(V ), the convex combination
(1− δ)0 + δδ−1ri = ri belongs to int(V ). 2
One implication of Proposition 3.1 is that a proposer always has the option to make a
proposal that strictly exceeds the reservation payoff of every player.
Proposition 3.2 In SSPE, for j ∈ N, if v ∈ AiS(j), then vk ≥ rik for all k ∈ S(j).
Proof: Suppose that (Θ,A) is a profile of stationary strategies such that v ∈ AiS(j) but
vk < r
i
k for some player k ∈ S(j). Consider a history in Hrk, where player k responds to
the proposal v made by player i. At that history player k could deviate from (Θ,A) by
rejecting v. In that case, an expected payoff of rik would result. Hence, this deviation is
profitable and (Θ,A) cannot be an SSPE. 2
Proposition 3.2 implies that for a vector of payoffs v to belong to the social acceptance
set, it should satisfy vj ≥ rij for all j ∈ N.
Proposition 3.3 In SSPE, for j ∈ N, if v ∈ V satisfies vk > rik for all k ∈ S(j), then
v ∈ AiS(j).
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Proof: Suppose that (Θ,A) is a profile of stationary strategies such that vk > rik for all
k ∈ S(j) and v /∈ AiS(j). Suppose first that v /∈ Ain. Consider a history in Hrn, where player
n responds to the proposal v made by player i.Then, player n could deviate from (Θ,A) by
accepting v. This would yield a payoff of vn > r
i
n, a contradiction. Consequently, v ∈ Ain.
We repeat the argument for players n− 1, n− 2, . . . , j to establish the proposition. 2
Proposition 3.3 established a kind of converse of Proposition 3.2. One implication of
this proposition is that a vector v ∈ V that satisfies vj > rij for all j ∈ N belongs to the
social acceptance set Aij.
Proposition 3.4 In SSPE, each player’s proposal θi lies in the social acceptance set Ai
for proposer i.
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that under some SSPE there is a player i ∈ N such
that θi /∈ Ai. Consider the subgame starting at a history where player i is the proposer.
Since θi is rejected, ri is the vector of expected payoffs by definition. By Proposition 3.1,
ri ∈ int(V ). Consequently, there exists v ∈ V such that vj > rij for all j ∈ N . By the
previous proposition, v ∈ Ai. Hence, it would be a profitable deviation for player i to
propose v instead of θi. 2
Proposition 3.5 In SSPE, θij ≥ 0 and rij ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N .
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that (Θ,A) is an SSPE and that θij < 0 for some
(i, j) ∈ N × N . Consider a history where player j has to respond to the proposal θi. By
Proposition 3.4, θi ∈ Ai, so player j will receive a strictly negative payoff if play proceeds
according to (Θ,A). But then, it would be a profitable deviation for player j to reject the
proposal. Consequently, it holds that θij ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N × N. It then follows that
rij ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N. 2
The next proposition establishes that an equilibrium proposal of any player gives all
other players their respective reservation payoffs. Thus a proposer always extracts the
entire surplus from the other players.
Proposition 3.6 In SSPE, θij = r
i
j for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N such that i 6= j.
Proof: Since θi ∈ Ai by Proposition 3.4, Proposition 3.2 implies that θij ≥ rij for all j ∈ N .
Suppose θik > r
i
k for some k ∈ N such that k 6= i. Define the vector v as follows,
vj =
θii if j = irij if j 6= i.
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The vector v is clearly non–negative and it is in V , because v ≤ θi and V is comprehensive.
Furthermore, vk = r
i
k < θ
i
k, so the vector v is dominated by θ
i and is therefore not strongly
Pareto–efficient. Since we assume that all weakly Pareto–efficient vectors of V+ are also
strongly Pareto–efficient, the vector v is not weakly Pareto–efficient. Thus, there exists a
vector v′ such that v′j > vj for all j ∈ N .
We show now that v′ ∈ Ai. Indeed, v′j > vj = rij for all j 6= i. And for player i we
have the inequality v′i > vi = θ
i
i ≥ rii. Thus we conclude that v′j > rij for all j ∈ N .
Proposition 3.3 now implies that v′ ∈ Ai, as desired.
But then player i has a profitable deviation at any history where he is entitled to make
a proposal, namely propose the vector v′ rather than θi. Indeed, the vector v′ is accepted
and results in a payoff of v′i > θ
i
i to player i. 2
Proposition 3.7 claims that all players make a proposal belonging to the boundary of
V.
Proposition 3.7 In SSPE, θi ∈ ∂V for each i ∈ N .
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a player i ∈ N such that θi ∈ int(V ).
Equivalently, there exists v ∈ V such that vj > θij for all j ∈ N . By the immediate
agreement property, θi ∈ Ai. This implies that v ∈ Ai as well. But then it would be a
profitable deviation for player i to propose v rather than θi. 2
The previous propositions are collected in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8 If (Θ,A) is an SSPE profile, then for all i ∈ N
AiS(j) ⊂ {v ∈ V |vj′ ≥ δ
n∑
k=1
mkiθ
k
j ,∀j′ ∈ S(j)}, j ∈ N, (1)
AiS(j) ⊃ {v ∈ V |vj′ > δ
n∑
k=1
mkiθ
k
j ,∀j′ ∈ S(j)} ∪ {θi}, j ∈ N, (2)
θi ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+, (3)
θij = r
i
j = δ
n∑
k=1
mkiθ
k
j , j ∈ N \ {i}. (4)
In what follows, we establish the converse; the four conditions of Theorem 3.8 char-
acterize the set of SSPE. We first apply the well-known one-shot deviation principle to
the game at hand. That is, we show that if there is a subgame where a player has some
profitable deviation from a stationary strategy profile, then there must also be a subgame
where this player has a profitable one-shot deviation. Here, a one-shot deviation in a sub-
game is a single deviation by the player at the root of the subgame. Next we show that no
player has a profitable one-shot deviation.
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Proposition 3.9 Let (Θ,A) be a stationary strategy profile satisfying (1)–(4). If there is
a subgame such that some player has a profitable deviation, then there is a subgame where
he has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Proof: Consider a subgame starting in period t′ and suppose that some, not necessarily
stationary, strategy si leads to a higher payoff for player i than (θi, Ai). Denote the gain
to player i from the deviation by ε > 0. For t > t′, let si(t) be the strategy that coincides
with si in periods t′, . . . , t− 1 and with (θi, Ai) in periods t, t + 1, . . . In any round t > t′,
we have by (1) that only proposals in V+ can be accepted. Let v¯i be an upper bound on
players i’s payoff when v ∈ V+. Then the gain to player i from a deviation to si(t) is at
least ε− δt−t′ v¯i/(1− δ). By choosing t > t′ + (ln(ε) + ln(1− δ)− ln(v¯i))/ ln(δ)) we have a
profitable deviation si(t) from (θi, Ai) that only involves a finite number of deviations.
If si(t) involves a deviation by player i at a history h ∈ Hri in period t − 1, and si(t)
is a profitable deviation from (θi, Ai) in subgame Γ(h), then the proposition holds. If si(t)
does not involve a profitable deviation by player i at any history h ∈ Hri in period t − 1,
then the strategy s¯i(t) that coincides with si in periods t′, . . . , t−2 and at histories h ∈ Hpi
in period t − 1 and with (θi, Ai) otherwise, is a profitable deviation from (θi, Ai) in the
subgame starting in period t′ under consideration.
By a similar argument as in the previous paragraph, we can show that s¯i(t) involves a
profitable deviation by player i in subgame Γ(h) with h a history in period t− 1 belonging
to Hpi , or the strategy s
i(t−1) is a profitable deviation from (θi, Ai) in the subgame starting
in period t′ under consideration. Repeating this argument a finite number of times leads
to a subgame where player i has a profitable one-shot deviation. 2
Proposition 3.10 Let (Θ,A) be a stationary strategy profile satisfying (1)–(4). There is
no subgame where a player has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Proof: Consider the subgame at a history h ∈ Hpi . Suppose player i has a one-shot
deviation involving a proposal vi different from θi. If vi does not belong to Ai, it leads to
a payoff rii for player i. Since θ
i
j = r
i
j for all j 6= i and ri ∈ int(V ), the Pareto-efficiency of
θi implies θii > r
i
i, so the deviation is not profitable. If v
i belongs to Ai, then, for j 6= i,
vij ≥ rij = θij by (1) and (4). Now vii ≤ θii, since otherwise the Pareto-efficiency of θi would
be violated. The deviation is not profitable.
Consider the subgame at a history h ∈ Hri . Let v denote the proposal being made,
say by player j. Consider a one-shot deviation by player i. If v ∈ Aji and v ∈ AjS(i), then
the deviation leads to a payoff rji for player i, which is less than or equal to vi, the payoff
resulting from not deviating. If v ∈ Aji and v /∈ AjS(i), then the deviation does not lead to
a change in payoffs. If v /∈ Aji and v ∈ ∩k∈S(i)\{i}Ajk, then the deviation leads to payoff vi,
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which is less than or equal to rji , the payoff resulting from not deviating. If v /∈ Aji and
v /∈ ∩k∈S(i)\{i}Ajk, then the deviation does not lead to a change in payoff. 2
The previous two propositions imply that the strategies conforming to the conditions
of Theorem 3.8 are subgame-perfect. Since they are also stationary, we have the following
Theorem 3.11 The strategy profile (Θ,A) fulfills the four conditions of Theorem 3.8 if
and only if it is an SSPE.
If a matrix Θ of proposals is part of an SSPE, then it is part of many SSPE’s. This
inessential multiplicity has two sources. First, if a responding player is proposed exactly
the reservation payoff, then our characterization restricts behavior only if the proposal
on the table is the equilibrium proposal. This is reflected in the fact that each point on
the boundary of a social acceptance set (except the relevant equilibrium proposal) may
or may not be an element of that set in SSPE. Second, if a proposal lies outside a social
acceptance set, it is indeterminate which player will reject the proposal. Consider for
example the case where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and r1 = (1, 1, 1, 1). Now suppose that player 1
has proposed v = (2, 2, 0, 0) in some subgame. Since v3 < r
1
3 and v4 < r
1
4, Proposition 3.2
implies that v /∈ A1, and by Proposition 3.4 v 6= θ1. It is also true that v /∈ A14: If the
node where player 4 has to respond is reached, that player effectively chooses between
a payoff of 1 and a payoff of 0, so SSPE requires rejection of the proposal. However,
the SSPE characterization leaves indeterminate whether players 1, 2, and 3 will accept
or reject v. Consequently, there is an SSPE for any configuration of responses by these
players. In particular, player 3 may accept v in SSPE although v3 < r
1
3, and player 2
may reject v although v2 > r
1
2. This reasoning even extends to player 1: In SSPE, it is
possible that v /∈ A11 although v1 > r11 and player 1 is the proposer. However, this does not
mean that player 1 may reject his own proposal on the equilibrium path, since the SSPE
characterization requires the specific proposal θ1 to be made and immediately accepted by
all players.
Proposition 3.12 Given v ∈ V+, let W (v) = {x ∈ V |x ≥ v}. For each i ∈ N there exists
a unique v′ ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+ such that v′j = vj for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Furthermore,
{v′} = arg max
x∈W (v)
xi.
Proof: Take any
v′ ∈ arg max
x∈W (v)
xi.
We show that v′ ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+ and v′j = vj for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Indeed, v′ ∈ Rn+, because
W (v) ⊂ Rn+. Furthermore, v′ is a boundary point of V , for if it was an interior point, there
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would exist a vector v˙ ∈ V such that v˙i > v′i for all i ∈ N , contradicting the choice of v′ as
a maximizer of xi over all points x ∈ W (v).
Suppose v′k > vk for some k ∈ N \ {i}. Define the vector x by the equation
xj =
v′j if j 6= kvk if j = k.
Then v′ ≥ x, so x is an element of V , because V is comprehensive from below. Furthermore,
x ≥ v ≥ 0. Since v′ ≥ x with the strict inequality for component k, x is not strongly Pareto–
efficient. Since we assume that all weakly Pareto–efficient vectors of V+ are also strongly
Pareto–efficient, x is not weakly Pareto–efficient, so there exists v˙ ∈ V such that v˙j > xj
for all j ∈ N . But then v˙ ≥ x ≥ v, so that v˙ ∈ W (v), and v˙i > xi = v′i, contradicting the
choice of v′ as a maximizer of xi over all points x in W (v).
Suppose now that there exists a vector v′′ ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+ other than v′ such that v′′j = vj
for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Without loss of generality assume v′i > v′′i . Then the vector v′′ is not
strongly Pareto–efficient. Since we assume that each weakly Pareto–efficient vector is also
strongly Pareto–efficient, v′′ is not weakly Pareto–efficient. But then v′′ is in the interior
of V , a contradiction. 2
Theorem 3.13 An SSPE exists.
Proof: We identify the set of SSPE of Γ with the set of fixed points of a map and use
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to establish existence. Consider a non–negative matrix Θ
with each column θi of Θ in the set V+. Let χ
i(Θ) be a vector satisfying the following
conditions:
χi(Θ) ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+ and χij(Θ) = δ
n∑
k=1
mkiθ
k
j for all j 6= i.
By Proposition 3.12, χi(Θ) is uniquely determined. Define now the function χ : V+ → V+
by letting χ(Θ) = (χ1(Θ), . . . , χn(Θ)). By the characterization of SSPE, if χ(Θ) = Θ for
a particular Θ ∈ V+, then there is at least one SSPE with Θ as the matrix of proposed
payoffs. The set V+ = V ∩ Rn+ contains the origin, it is convex and closed, as it is the
intersection of two convex and closed sets, and it is bounded. Since the maximum theorem
can be used to show that χ is continuous, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem implies that it
has a fixed point. 2
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4 The Limit Equilibrium
Our proofs so far did not rely on Assumptions A2 and A3. They will be needed for the
results of this section. Since the matrix M is irreducible, it has a unique stationary distri-
bution denoted by µ. Recall that the stationary distribution µ is a probability distribution
on the set of players N satisfying the equation Mµ = µ. Furthermore, irreducibility of
M implies that all states occur with positive probability under the stationary distribution,
that is µi > 0 for each i ∈ N . If the matrix M was reducible, the state space of M could be
partitioned into several communicating classes. In this case, one obtains results analogous
to those in the sequel within each communicating class.
Theorem 4.2 below is the main result of the paper. As the continuation probability goes
to one, along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria of Γ, the equilibrium
proposal of all players converges to the same limit. This common limit is the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution weighted by the stationary distribution µ, denoted µ-ANBS.
Definition 4.1 The asymmetric Nash product with weights µ is the function ρ : V → R
defined by
ρ(v) =
∏
i∈N
(vi)
µi .
The µ–ANBS is the unique maximizer of the function ρ on the set V .
Theorem 4.2 Let {δm} be a sequence of continuation probabilities in [0, 1) converging to
1. For each m, let Θ(δm) be a matrix of proposals in some SSPE of the game Γ with
continuation probability δm. Then the limits lim θ
i(δm) exist for each i ∈ N . All limits are
equal to the µ–ANBS.
Let δm and Θ(δm) be as in Theorem 4.2. The sequence {Θ(δm)} has a convergent
subsequence, as it lies in the compact set V+. For the remainder of this section, we will
fix any such convergent subsequence and denote its limit by Θ¯. Since the convergent
subsequence considered is arbitrary, to prove Theorem 4.2 it is sufficient to show that each
column of the matrix Θ¯ is the µ–ANBS.
We now give a brief overview of the argument. First we show that along the sequence
{Θ(δm)} of equilibria the proposals of all players converge to a common limit, say the point
θ¯ ∈ V . We then compute the tangent space to the set ∂V at the point θ¯ by considering the
pairwise differences of the equilibrium proposals of players i and n, and show they converge
to zero at the same speed as 1 − δm. In fact, we are able to compute explicitly the limits
of the vectors (θi(δm)− θn(δm))/(1− δm), which are then shown to span the tangent space
to the set ∂V at the point θ¯. Using this result we show next that the tangent space at
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θ¯ is orthogonal to the gradient of the asymmetric Nash product with weights µ, thereby
showing that θ¯ is the µ–ANBS.
Proposition 4.3 All columns of Θ¯ are identical.
Proof: For any i 6= j, it follows from the SSPE characterization that
θ¯ij =
n∑
k=1
mkiθ¯
k
j .
Suppose that, contrary to the proposition, not all limit proposals θ¯1, . . . , θ¯n are the
same. Let j ∈ N be such that in the limit not all players propose the same to player j,
and choose θ¯j to be either mini∈N{θ¯ij} or maxi∈N{θ¯ij}, whichever is not equal to θ¯jj . Define
N = {i ∈ N |θ¯ij = θ¯j}. For any i ∈ N, we have
θ¯j = θ¯

j
∑
k∈N
mki +
∑
k∈N\N
mkiθ¯
k
j ,
which is equivalent to
θ¯j
∑
k∈N\N
mki =
∑
k∈N\N
mkiθ¯
k
j .
Suppose first that for some i ∈ N,∑
k∈N\N
mki > 0.
Then
θ¯j =
∑
k∈N\Nmkiθ¯
k
j∑
k∈N\Nmki
,
which contradicts the fact that either θ¯j < θ¯
k
j for all k ∈ N \ N or θ¯j > θ¯kj for all
k ∈ N \N. Therefore, mki = 0 for all (i, k) ∈ N × (N\N) and thus N is an absorbing
set. Since N 6= N , this contradicts the irreducibility assumption on M . 2
We denote a column of Θ¯ by θ¯. For i ∈ N \ {n}, we define
di(δm) =
θi(δm)− θn(δm)
1− δm .
Let D(δm) be the n× (n− 1)–matrix with columns d1(δm), . . . , dn−1(δm).
The rest of the proof is organized as follows. In Proposition 4.5 we compute the limits of
di(δm) as m goes to infinity. Proposition 4.6 establishes that the limit of {di(δm)} belongs
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to the tangent space to ∂V at θ¯. We then proceed to show in Proposition 4.8 that the
limits of d1(δm), . . . , d
n−1(δm) are linearly independent and thus span the tangent space to
∂V at θ¯. And finally, Proposition 4.9 establishes that the gradient of the Nash product
with weights µ at the point θ¯ is orthogonal to the tangent space of V, thereby showing that
θ¯ is the µ–ANBS.
For a matrix A, we denote by A−i and A−i the matrix A without its ith row and column,
respectively. We write 1 for a column vector of ones and I for the identity matrix.
For j ∈ N, we define the matrix L(j) by
L(j) = [M − I]−j−n.
Thus L(j) is the (n− 1)× (n− 1)–matrix obtained from M − I by deleting column j and
row n. Proposition 4.4 is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.4 The matrix L(j) is invertible for all j ∈ N.
Proof: Suppose L(j) is singular. Let a be a non–zero vector such that [M − I]−j−na = 0.
Since the elements in any column of the matrix M − I add up to zero, we also have the
equation (M − I)−jn a = 0, so [M − I]−ja = 0. By using [M − I]−j = (M − I)I−j and
defining b = I−ja, we see that (M − I)b = 0. Thus the vector b is an eigenvector of M
associated with eigenvalue 1. By the Perron–Frobenius theorem, any non-zero eigenvector
of M associated with eigenvalue 1 is a strictly positive vector. However, since bj = 0, we
have obtained a contradiction. Consequently, the matrix L(j) is invertible. 2
Proposition 4.5 The sequence {D(δm)} of matrices converges to the matrix D¯ with rows
given by d¯j = θ¯j1
>L−1(j) for j ∈ N .
Proof: We fix m and denote δm by δ, θ
i(δm) by θ
i, and di(θm) by di.
For each j ∈ N and i ∈ N \ {j, n},
dij(1− δ) = θi − θn = δ
n∑
k=1
mkiθ
k
j − θnj
= δ
n∑
k=1
mki(θ
k
j − θnj ) + δθnj − θnj ,
where we use (4) for the second equality, so
dij = δ
n−1∑
k=1
mkid
k
j − θnj .
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We have found that
θnj = δ
∑
k/∈{i,n}
mkid
k
j + (δmii − 1)dij, j ∈ N, i ∈ N \ {j, n}. (5)
Similarly, for j 6= n,
djj(1− δ) = θjj − δ
n∑
k=1
mknθ
k
j
= θjj − δ
n∑
k=1
mkn(θ
k
j − θnj )− δθnj
= θjj − θnj − δ
n∑
k=1
mkn(θ
k
j − θnj ) + (1− δ)θnj ,
where we use (4) for the second inequality, so
djj = d
j
j − δ
n−1∑
k=1
mknd
k
j + θ
n
j .
We have found that
θnj = δ
n−1∑
k=1
mknd
k
j , j ∈ N \ {n}. (6)
We write (5)–(6) in vector–matrix notation as
θnj 1
> = dj(δM − I)−j−n, j ∈ N.
The matrix (M − I)−j−n is invertible by Proposition 4.4, and so is the matrix (δM − I)−j−n
for δ close enough to one. Thus, for every j ∈ N, we can solve the above system for dj as
dj = θ
n
j 1
>[(δM − I)−j−n]−1.
As δm goes to one, the sequence θ
n
j (δm) converges to θ¯j by Proposition 4.3. Thus the
sequence dj(δm) converges to θ¯j1
>L−1(j), as desired. 2
Proposition 4.5 expresses each row j of the matrix D¯ as the sum of the rows of the matrix
L−1(j) multiplied by the scalar θ¯j.
We show now that each column of the matrix D¯ is orthogonal to the normal vector of
V at the point θ¯, which is unique by Assumption A3. This is equivalent to saying that
each column of the matrix D¯ belongs to the tangent space of ∂V at θ¯. We let span(D¯)
denote the column span of the matrix D¯.
Proposition 4.6 It holds that span(D¯) is orthogonal to the normal vector of V at θ¯.
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Proof: Let ηi(δm) denote the normal vector of V at the point θ
i(δm). Since {θi(δm)}
converges to θ¯, the sequence {ηi(δm)} converges to η¯, the normal vector to the set V at
the point θ¯. By the definition of the normal vector,
ηn(δm)
>(θi(δm)− θn(δm)) ≤ 0 and ηi(δm)>(θi(δm)− θn(δm)) ≥ 0.
Dividing by 1− δm and passing to the limit yields the inequalities η¯>d¯i ≤ 0 and η¯>d¯i ≥ 0,
therefore η¯>d¯i = 0, as desired. 2
Propositions 4.7 and 4.8 address the dimension of span(D¯). We show that the columns
of D¯ are linearly independent, thus establishing that span(D¯) equals the tangent space of
∂V at θ¯.
For j ∈ N, let Kj be the sum of the rows of the matrix L−1(j), thus
Kj = 1
>L−1(j).
Define K as the n× (n− 1)–matrix with rows Kj. Proposition 4.7 expresses all rows of K
in terms of rows of L−1(n) and the stationary distribution µ induced by M.
Proposition 4.7 Any combination of n − 1 distinct rows of the matrix K is linearly in-
dependent. Furthermore,
Kj = 1
>L−1(j) = 1>L−1(n)− 1
µj
(L−1(n))j, j ∈ N \ {n}.
Proof: We define x = [M − I]n−n. Consider some j ∈ N \{n}. It can be verified by a direct
computation that
L−1(j) =

(L−1(n))1 − (L
−1(n)x)1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))j−1 − (L
−1(n)x)j−1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
(L−1(n))j+1 − (L
−1(n)x)j+1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))n−1 − (L
−1(n)x)n−1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j

.
The formula above is well-known in linear programming and is used to compute the sim-
plex tableau following from a change in basis variables. By definition of the stationary
distribution we have
L(n)µ−n + xµn = 0.
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We multiply this expression by L−1(n) and rearrange to obtain
L−1(n)x = −µ−n/µn.
By substitution, we find that
L−1(j) =

(L−1(n))1 − µ1
µj
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))j−1 − µj−1
µj
(L−1(n))j
(L−1(n))j+1 − µj+1
µj
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))n−1 − µn−1
µj
(L−1(n))j
−µn
µj
(L−1(n))j

.
Summing up the rows of L−1(j) we get
1>L−1(j) =
∑
i∈N\{j,n}
(L−1(n))i +
µj − 1
µj
)(L−1(n))j = 1>L−1(n)− 1
µj
(L−1(n))j.
Therefore,
K−n = [11> − C]L−1(n),
where C is the (n− 1)–diagonal matrix with element 1/µi in column i.
The matrix [11> − C] is non–singular. Suppose not, then there is y 6= 0 such that
[11> − C]y = 0. It follows that 11>y = Cy = (y1/µ1, . . . , yn−1/µn−1)>, from which it
follows in particular that 1>y 6= 0. By pre-multiplying the last equality with the row
vector (µ1, . . . , µn−1), we find that (1 − µn)1>y = 1>y, a contradiction since µn > 0.
Consequently, the matrix [11> − C] is non–singular.
It follows that K−n is non–singular. Since the labeling of players is arbitrary, we have
shown that any combination of n−1 distinct rows of the matrix K is linearly independent.
2
Proposition 4.8 It holds that θ¯i > 0 for all i ∈ N . The column span of the matrix D¯ has
dimension n− 1.
Proof: We know that θ¯i ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N . Partition N into the set N0 of players i such
that θ¯i = 0 and the set N+ of players i such that θ¯i > 0.
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Suppose that the set N0 is non–empty, so that the set N+ consists of at most n − 1
elements. We show first that θ¯ ∈ span(D¯) by constructing a vector z ∈ Rn−1 such that
D¯z = θ¯. Since the rows Ki of the matrix K corresponding to the elements i of the set
N+ are linearly independent by Proposition 4.7, there exists a vector z ∈ Rn−1 such that
Kiz = 1 for all i ∈ N+. Then d¯iz = θ¯iKiz = θ¯i for all i ∈ N+. Trivially, z also satisfies the
equations d¯iz = θ¯iKiz = 0 = θ¯i for each i ∈ N0.
Let η be the normal vector to V at the point θ¯. Since η is orthogonal to span(D¯)
by Proposition 4.6, we have η>θ¯ = 0. Since zero is in the interior of V by assumption,
the vector εη is in the set V for ε > 0 small enough. But then we have the inequality
η>(εη − θ¯) = ε(η>η) > 0, contradicting the definition of a normal vector. Consequently,
the set N0 is empty. We have established the first part of the proposition.
To prove the second part of the proposition, notice that D¯ can be written as the product
TK, where T is a diagonal matrix with θ¯i in column i. Since θ¯i > 0 for each i ∈ N , the
matrix T has full rank n, and the matrix K has rank n − 1 by Proposition 4.7. This
establishes the second part of the proposition. 2
We now establish that the gradient of the logarithm of the asymmetric Nash product with
weights µ is orthogonal to the column span of the matrix D¯. We observe that
ln ρ(v) =
∑
i∈N
µi ln(vi).
Proposition 4.9 It holds that span(D¯) is orthogonal to the gradient of the function ln ρ
at the point θ¯.
Proof: The gradient of ln ρ at θ¯ is the vector g given by gj = µj/θ¯j, j ∈ N. We have the
following chain of equations∑
j∈N
gj d¯j =
∑
j∈N
µj1
>L−1(j)
=
∑
j∈N\{n}
µj[1
>L−1(n)− 1
µj
(L−1(n))j] + µn1>L−1(n)
= 1>L−1(n)−
∑
j∈N\{n}
(L−1(n))j
= 1>L−1(n)− 1>L−1(n) = 0,
where the first equality uses the result of Proposition 4.5, and the second one Proposi-
tion 4.7. This establishes the proposition. 2
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is now immediate. The column span of the matrix D¯ is orthogonal
to the normal vector of V at θ¯ by Proposition 4.6, and at the same time it is orthogonal to
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the gradient of ln ρ at θ¯ by Proposition 4.9. Since span(D¯) has dimension n−1 (Proposition
4.8), it follows at once that the gradient of the function ln ρ is proportional to the normal
vector to V at θ¯. Hence, the point θ¯ is the maximizer of the function ln ρ on the set V, as
well as the maximizer of the function ρ on the set V.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided further non-cooperative support to the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution. We demonstrate that existing results are instances of a much more
generally valid principle. We consider a bargaining process involving any number of players,
an arbitrary irreducible Markov process that determines the selection of the proposer, and
any set of feasible payoffs that is bounded, convex, and has a smooth boundary. As long
as no agreement is reached, negotiations break down with some fixed probability.
We fully characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. We
show that at least one such equilibrium exists and argue that in general there are many
such equilibria. We continue by studying the limit of an arbitrary sequence of equilibria
when the probability of breakdown goes to zero. We establish that in the limit all players
make the same proposal. Moreover, this proposal is the same as the one corresponding
to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, where the weights in the Nash product are
equal to the stationary distribution of the Markov process that determines the selection of
the proposer.
One implication is that if players are selected as proposer in some fixed order, then
the symmetric Nash bargaining solution is achieved in the limit. This can be seen as a
generalization of alternating offer bargaining to more than two players. Another implication
is that if players are selected according to time-invariant probabilities, these probabilities
are equal to the weights in the Nash product. The symmetric Nash bargaining solution
would again result if the time-invariant probabilities are uniform.
It is noteworthy that the bargaining power of the players is only affected by the sta-
tionary distribution of the proposer selection process. The particular shape of the set of
feasible payoffs is irrelevant for the weights of the players in the Nash product, as are the
particular probabilities by which the proposer in the next period is chosen conditional on
the current proposer.
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